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MOBY-DICK: THE READER AND THE ACT OF 
COGNITION
Bryce Conrad
En R o u t e  T o  board the packet schooner for Nantucket, Queequeg recalls 
his first encounter with a wheelbarrow. Not comprehending the unfamiliar 
object’s function, he tied his sea chest to it and then proceeded to hoist the 
entire affair onto his shoulders for transport. Ishmael’s incredulous reaction 
to the story might well be that o f any “civilized” man: “Queequeg, you might 
have known better than that, one would think. Didn’t people laugh?” 1 The 
reply to Ishmael’s query comes in the form o f another tale—this time 
one about a sea captain who attended a wedding feast on Queequeg’s native 
island o f Kokovoko. Unfamiliar with the particular dining protocol o f his 
hosts, the visitor decided to take his lead from  the island king who 
dipped his fingertips into a large bowl o f liquid which had been placed 
before the assembled company. The captain surmised that the king’s actions 
m eant washing was in order before the meal, and he proceeded to bathe 
his hands in what turned out to be a ceremonial wedding beverage freshly 
consecrated by the king’s fingers. Queequeg pointedly returns Ishmael’s 
question: “Now. . .what do you tink now?—Didn’t our people laugh?” 
(p. 59). Ishmael does not respond. The reader is left to ponder for himself 
whether Queequeg’s people laughed or not at witnessing an act probably 
no less strange to them than a m an carrying a loaded wheelbarrow on his 
back would be to Ishmael. Yet certainly something more instructive emerges 
from the juxtaposition o f these two tales than a brief lesson in comparative 
anthropology. For if Queequeg “might have known better” than to lift a 
wheelbarrow onto his back, by what cognitive process could he arrive at 
such knowledge? Is there something in the wheelbarrow itself which makes 
Queequeg’s use of the object “less correct” than civilized m an’s? Even if one 
assumes that the wheelbarrow’s maker constructed the object to possess a 
particular function and that all other uses to which it might be put are merely 
interpretive “mistakes,” can one in turn also posit a heuristic com ponent in 
the object which will ensure that the m aker’s purpose is fulfilled? W hat is 
to prohibit the individual—as in the case o f the sea captain—from interpret­
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ing the significance o f an unfamiliar object or phenom enon within a range 
o f possibilities determ ined by the norm s o f his familiar experience and 
knowledge? One may view the problem  as purely anthropological if the 
thing or event in question belongs to the ordinary experiential world of one 
group o f people or another. Yet Moby-Dick concerns not only wheelbarrows 
on the docks o f New Bedford and ceremonial practices among primitive 
societies, but “ the interlinked terrors and wonders o f God” (p. 99) which one 
encounters on “the unhooped oceans of this planet” (p. 171).
The whaling vessel provides the primary instrumentality for shifting these 
speculative questions to an epistemological level: “For many years past the 
whale-ship has been the pioneer in ferreting out the remotest and least 
known parts o f the earth. She has explored seas and archipelagoes which 
had no chart” (p. 99) and penetrated “into the rem otest secret drawers and 
lockers of the world” (p. 382). Furthermore, the ship sets forth the paradigm 
o f obtaining “value” by voyaging into the unknow n—the encounter with 
leviathan contains a promise o f distilling his “essence” in a tangible and 
material form. Yet the whaling ship, unlike the cognizing minds o f some o f 
her crew members, sails on the premise o f reducing whatever is unfamiliar 
in the whale to a familiar m onetary value: “. . .for however peculiar . . . any 
chance whale may be, they soon put an end to his peculiarities by killing 
him, and boiling him down into a peculiarly valuable oil” (p. 176)—and that 
“peculiarly valuable oil” is defined as such only within the context o f the 
Nantucket market and the lamps o f the world.
Thus the whalemen themselves—unless, like Flask, they accept the “val­
ues” o f the Nantucket m arket with such assurance that they look upon 
leviathan as “but a species o f magnified m ouse” (p. 106)—may not be so 
guided in their probing o f the unknown, for “o f all sailors, they are by all 
odds the most directly brought into contact with whatever is appallingly 
astonishing in the sea; face to face they not only eye its greatest marvels, but, 
hand to jaw, give battle to them ” (p. 156). Certainly neither Ishmael nor 
Ahab restricts his attempts to discover the significance and import o f the 
unknown to the context provided by the Nantucket whaling market. How­
ever, the paradoxical proposition o f desiring to “know” what is “unknown” 
—as the “W heelbarrow ” chapter has pointed ou t—presents no clear 
guidelines. Ahab may accost the whale himself with “Speak, thou vast and 
venerable head” (p. 264), but “not one syllable” does it utter. Ishmael may 
concede the “pyramidical silence” (p. 264) o f the whale and endeavor to 
examine him anatomically piece by piece, but he finally declares, “Dissect 
him how I may, then, I go but skin deep; I know him not, and never will” 
(p. 318). Yet the inscrutability o f the visible and the sensory leads Ahab to 
proclaim that “All visible objects, man, are but pasteboard masks. But in 
each event—in the living act, the undoubted deed—there, some unknown 
but still reasoning thing puts forth the moldings o f its features from behind 
the unreasoning mask. If m an will strike, strike through the mask!” (p. 144).
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Ahab, however, cannot avoid admitting, “Sometimes I think there’s naught 
beyond” (p. 144). And even Ishmael reveals a desire to verify what might 
lie “beyond” when he longs to “leap the topm ost skies, to see whether the 
fabled heavens with all their countless tents really lie encamped beyond my 
m ortal sight!” (p. 233).
For the reader of Moby-Dick, the novel’s overwhelming interpretive difficul­
ties reside in the fact that knowing the unknown becomes as much his 
problem  as it does any particular character’s. The mysterious objects and 
phenom ena encountered in reading the text—whether Queequeg’s tattoos, 
the nightly spouting o f a unseen sea creature, or the white whale himself— 
are not defined by the characters for the reader, but remain resonant 
symbols by which the characters themselves are partially defined. “The 
D oubloon” chapter offers the most explicit example. Ishmael wryly intro­
duces that section with his observation that “some certain significance lurks 
in all things, else all things are worth little, and the round world itself is but 
an empty cipher, except to sell by the cartload, as they do in hills about 
Boston, to fill up some morass in the Milky W ay” (p. 358). Then, in succes­
sion, Ahab, Starbuck, Stubb, Flask, the M anxman, and Pip attem pt to discov­
er “some certain significance” in the doubloon—six varied readings o f the 
coin, yet as Stubb comments, “but still one text” (p. 362). The significance 
o f the doubloon itself, however, remains the openness o f possibility by virtue 
o f each interpreter supplying his own subjective and “self-reflecting” context 
in order to effect his act o f cognition. Ahab places the coin in the context 
o f his quest to find “W ho’s over m e?” (p. 144): “The firm tower, that is Ahab; 
the volcano, that is Ahab; the courageous, the undaunted, and the victorious 
fowl, that, too, is Ahab; all are Ahab; and this round gold is but the image 
o f the rounder globe, which like a magician’s glass, to each and every man 
in turn mirrors back his own mysterious se lf ’ (p. 359). The world “mirrors 
back” Ahab’s “own mysterious se lf ’ because only through that self can he 
perceive the world—thus objects become opaque masks which admit not o f 
the “beyond” unless one can “strike through the mask.” The doubloon 
serves, in part, to reveal Ahab to the reader, just as it reveals Flask and his 
Nantucket market context: “I see nothing here, but a round thing made o f 
gold, and whoever raises a certain whale, this round thing belongs to him. 
So what’s all this staring about? It is worth sixteen dollars, tha t’s true; and 
at two cents the cigar, tha t’s nine hundred and sixty cigars” (p. 361). Stubb’s 
attem pt “at raising a m eaning out o f these queer curvicues here with the 
Massachusetts calendar” (p. 361) provokes the most telling comment on the 
act o f reading or cognizing the significance in things: “Book! you lie there; 
the fact is, you books must know your places. You’ll do to give us the bare 
words and facts, but we come in to supply the thoughts” (pp. 360-61). He 
might as aptly have stated that we come in to supply the context.
“I look, you look, he looks; we look, ye look, they look,” (p. 362) says Pip. 
The reader, too, might try his hand “at raising a meaning” from the dou-
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bloon o r the “book” o f Moby-Dick, yet no final “objective” or stable 
interpretation can emerge from the novel itself because its contextual frame­
work or border is, paradoxically, unfram ed and borderless. The Pequod takes 
the reader away from “safety, comfort, hearthstone, supper, warm blankets, 
friends, all that’s kind to our m ortalities” (p. 97), and into a “howling 
infinite” o f “unshored, harborless immensities” (p. 116). Within such an 
unlimited vastness, the symbolic possibilities o f objects and events retain a 
plurality undiminished in its potential by any specific context necessarily 
imposed upon them  by the characters or reader in the act o f cognition—for 
without a context, cognition remains impossible. In his The Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms, Ernst Cassirer points out that “Every ‘simple’ quality o f 
consciousness has a definite content only in so far as it is apprehended in 
complete unity with certain qualities but separately from others. The func­
tion o f this unity and this separation is not removable from the content of 
consciousness but constitutes one o f its essential conditions.”2 Cassirer’s 
thinking here bears obvious affinities with Ishmael’s assertion that “there is 
no quality in this world that is not what it is merely by contrast. Nothing 
exists in itse lf’ (p. 55). And it is precisely this dependence of content on 
context which reveals the full extent o f the reader’s difficult position in 
attem pting to grasp the symbolic elements o f the text. For the novel often 
thwarts the reader’s facile interpretations by showing that the contexts 
provided by m an are invariably extensions o f his familiar and habitual 
knowledge.
Queequeg’s juxtaposed tales dem onstrate that a wheelbarrow divorced 
from its familiar context resonates with as much symbolic possibility as an 
isolated hieroglyph. And without the familiar context of hand-washing be­
fore a meal, the king o f Kokovoko dipping his fingers into the ceremonial 
bowl would appear as suggestively luminous as the “mystic gestures” which 
Ishmael associates with the whale’s tail: “. . .1 have heard hunters who have 
declared them akin to Free-Mason signs and symbols; that the whale, indeed, 
by these methods intelligently conversed with the world” (p. 317). Further­
more, the novel’s non-verification o f any governing context in the universe 
at large raises the somewhat staggering consideration—implicit, however, 
in Moby-Dick—that all objects, events, motions, and phenom ena may be 
innately symbolic and that the entire cosmos itself exists, like the novel, as 
a text o f unfathomable pluralities. In a sense, Moby-Dick has taken the logical 
simplicities of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century natural theology 
with its teleological arguments for the existence o f God, and has turned 
those simplicities into cognitive and metaphysical complexities. The grand 
scope o f such an idea naturally induces speculation about the existence of 
a supreme context—whether Plato’s realm  o f unchangeable forms, Kant’s 
absolute being, or an om nipotent deity—which would enable m an to posit 
the likelihood o f a single m eaning for things rather than to inhabit a world 
o f symbolic pluralities. And within the textual world of the novel, few critics
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and readers have not speculated on the possible existence o f a key or code 
which would render one stable m eaning from Moby-Dick.
Yet unless the reader approaches the text with an already delineated value 
he wishes to extract—as the whaling vessel ostensibly goes to sea for a 
particular “value”—he must depend upon the novel itself to set out some 
kind of interpretive restraints. Carey H. Kirk comments, “In many respects, 
the novel’s audience cannot react to it at all without being attracted and 
guided by the opposition between Ahab and Ishmael. These alternatives 
provide one o f the few fences around an unmanageably expansive book and 
do set some limits on potential chaos.”3 One might, however, challenge the 
validity o f such a “fence” on the grounds that it implicitly assumes an 
oppostion between Ahab’s and Ishmael’s view of the world which primarily 
finds interpretive articulation in a piecing together o f the epistemological 
theories that would seem to inform the thoughts and behavior o f the two. 
Robert Zoellner’s study o f the novel is founded upon such a piecing together 
o f Ahab’s and Ishmael’s implied theories o f cognition: “ . . .the difference 
between Ahab, the dramatic expositor o f Moby-Dick and Ishmael, the narra ­
tive expositor, is epistemological. They do not agree on the relationship 
between perceiver and perceived. This disagreement lies at the root o f 
Moby-Dick. If Ahab is right, then Ishmael is wrong; if Ishmael is right, then 
Ahab is wrong.”4 Yet Zoellner’s rigorous application o f this “disagreement” 
proves to be more o f a critical construct than an interpretive border provid­
ed by the novel when he subsequently elevates Ishmael’s “scientifically 
correct analysis o f perception” at the expense o f Ahab’s “grossness o f 
realization” which “sees only ugliness and malice in life” (Zoellner, pp. 26, 
108, 115).
A similar approach is to define the luminous symbolism o f Moby-Dick by 
contrasting it with the emblematic stasis o f allegory, and hence to draw the 
distinction, as does W alter E. Bezanson, that Ishmael accepts a vision o f 
symbolic potential while A hab’s “destruction follows when he substitutes an 
allegorical fixation for the world o f symbolic potentialities.”5 But here Bezan­
son seems, quite contradictorily, to posit for himself some governing force 
in the universe which metes out destruction for that act o f allegorization on 
A hab’s part. Furthermore, to allegorize the world, one must know the 
absolute context which defines the emblematic meaning o f objects and 
events—in this respect, Ahab does not allegorize the world but rather 
directs all his energy toward discovering whether the world is allegorical, 
indeed whether there is a supreme context. The distinction presents no mere 
critical quibble if one insists on establishing Ahab and Ishmael as the borders 
for the reader’s responses to Moby-Dick. The often voiced critical claim that 
Ahab imperiously decides that whatever lies “beyond” must be “Evil,” fails 
to take into account Ahab’s own admission that there may be “naught 
beyond,” and that Ahab circularly defines “Evil” as whatever is “beyond” 
and unseen. As his “complete m an after a desireable pattern” (p. 390)
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indicates, Ahab demands the capability to know rather than proclaims his 
capacity for knowledge:
Imprimis, fifty feet high in his socks; then, a chest modelled after the Thames Tunnel; 
then, legs with root to ’em, to stay in one place; then, arms three feet through the wrist; 
no heart at all, brass forehead, and about a quarter o f  an acre o f  fine brains; and let me 
see—shall I order eyes to see outwards? No, but put a sky light on the top o f his head 
to illuminate inwards, (p. 390)
Ideally, Ahab rejects his own eyes, which can only gaze upon the “paste­
board masks” o f the sensory world—he wants a window toward the cosmos 
in order to be illuminated “inwards” concerning an absolute context and 
a m eaning of things. Ultimately, he suffers from his incapacity for knowl­
edge. Suggestive but inscrutable symbols such as Queequeg’s hieroglyphic 
tattoos present a “devilish tantalization o f the gods” (p. 399). Since Ahab 
cannot know their m eaning is precisely why he so vehemently deprecates 
against all omens, dim intimations, and vague intuitions o f “tru th”: “If the 
gods think to speak outright to man, they will honorably speak outright; not 
shake their heads, and give an old wives’ darkling hint” (p. 452). Ahab’s 
defiance is, finally, defiance o f inscrutability, o f “ the dead blind wall” which 
“butts all enquiring heads at last” (p. 427). Yet Ishmael also examines the 
whale and finds “a dead blind wall” (p. 284). He posits at one point a “clear 
T ru th” inaccessible to man, “a thing for salam ander giants only to encoun­
ter” (p. 286). Ishmael may even succumb to a certain type o f “m onom a­
nia”—or m ore properly, “m onophobia”—which manifests itself not in a 
physical assault on “the unseen thing,” but in his feeling that it will inevitably 
rem ain “unseen” and inaccessible for those who seek it:
Were this world an endless plain, and by sailing eastward we could for ever reach new 
distances, and discover sights more sweet and strange than any Cyclades or Islands o f  
King Solomon, then there were promise in the voyage. But in the pursuit o f  those far 
mysteries we dream of, or in tormented chase o f  that demon phantom that, some time 
or other, swims before all human hearts; while chasing such over this round globe, they 
either lead us on in barren mazes or midway leave us whelmed, (p. 204)
The statem ent may well serve as a m etaphor for the reader’s own cogni­
tive chase of a meaning in Moby-Dick. And what provides an interpretive 
border for that chase is not any philosophical program  or epistemological 
theory which either Ishmael o r Ahab embodies for the reader, but the actual 
process by which the reader attem pts to assemble a meaning for the text— 
for the reading of Moby-Dick constitutes the sole cognitive act in which the 
reader is engaged. At the most basic ontological level, the novel is simply 
an assemblage o f words written or compiled for  the reader. Here one must 
consider Ishmael not only as character, but also as narrator—for in this 
latter role he becomes, as A. Robert Lee suggests, a type o f “monkey-rope” 
com panion for the reader who would otherwise find himself hopelessly 
adrift am ong “the constituents o f a chaos” (p. 117).6 With the opening sen­
tence o f the “Loomings” chapter— “Call me Ishmael”—the narrator estab-
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lishes his prerogative to give instructions while the reader’s continued read­
ing o f the text implies compliance with or fulfillment o f those instructions. 
This dynamic interaction between narrator and reader immediately defines 
the two as mutually dependent—they are united by a “Siamese ligature” not 
unlike that which binds Ishmael and Queequeg in “The Monkey-Rope” 
chapter: “I seemed distinctly to perceive that my own individuality was now 
merged in a joint stock company o f two. . . . Nor could I possibly forget that, 
do what I would, I had only the m anagem ent of one end o f it” (p. 271). 
Ishmael certainly does not forget—indeed, it would be difficult to find a 
narrator who evinces more care in manipulating his end o f the line. Paradox­
ically, however, Ishmael’s overt instructions to the reader seem to promise 
the immanence o f a meaning rather than its absence. As Warwick Wadling- 
ton notes, Ishmael’s language gives rise to “the cognitive impulse, the desire 
to obtain final answers from an alluring world that stimulates interpreta­
tion.”7 Ishmael repeatedly commands the reader to look upon what appears 
to be puzzling and inexplicable, questions him as to its significance, and then 
delivers an explanatory statement:
Circumambulate the city o f  a dreamy Sabbath afternoon. Go from Corlears Hook to 
Coenties Slip, and from thence, by Whitehall, northward. What do you see?—Posted like 
silent sentinels all around the town, stand thousands upon thousands o f  mortal men fixed 
in ocean reveries. . . . How then is this? Are the green fields gone? What do they here? 
But look! here come more crowds, pacing straight for the water, and seemingly bound 
for a dive. Strange! Nothing will content them but the extremest limit o f the land. . . .  Tell 
me, does the magnetic virtue in the needles o f  the compasses o f  all those ships attract 
them thither? (pp. 12-13)
Ishmael does not abandon the reader after this barrage o f grammatical 
imperatives and queries have been directed at him, but offers an interpreta­
tion in the guise o f an answer: “Yes, as every one knows, meditation and 
water are wedded for ever” (p. 13). After another round of questions for the 
reader, Ishmael concludes with the story o f Narcissus, explicitly proffering 
it as “the image o f the ungraspable phantom  of life” and “the key to it all” 
(p. 14). If the reader senses some duplicity on the narrator’s part in linking 
“the key to it all” with an “ungraspable phantom ,” Ishmael allays rather 
than exacerbates those incipient suspicions by involving him in an investiga­
tion o f Ishmael’s own motives for signing aboard a whaling ship rather than 
undertaking the accustomed voyage with the m erchant service. He claims 
to “see a little into the springs and motives” and reveals that “one grand 
hooded phantom, like a snow hill in the air” had its place among “the wild 
conceits” which urged him on (p. 16). Yet in the implicit link between 
Ishmael’s “one grand hooded phantom ” and “the ungraspable phantom ” 
which he intimates is “the key to it all,” Ishmael has attem pted to sway the 
reader to his narrative purpose. The phantom-like image which the reader 
will pursue in the ensuing pages has been equated with the phantom-like 
image which the narrator will pursue in writing about his own past experi­
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ence. And Ishmael solidifies this cognitive pact between himself and the 
reader in the form o f an “oath” during a “second-person” scrutiny of the 
painting in the Spouter-Inn:
But what puzzled most and confounded you was a long, limber portentous, black mass 
o f  something hovering in the centre o f  the picture over three blue, dim, perpendicular 
lines floating in a nameless yeast. A boggy, soggy, squitchy picture truly, enough to drive 
a nervous man distracted. Yet was there a sort o f  indefinite, half attained, unimaginable 
sublimity about it that fairly froze you to it, till you involuntarily took an oath with 
yourself to find out what that marvellous painting meant. Ever and anon a bright, but, 
alas, deceptive idea would dart you through— It’s the Black Sea in a midnight gale.— It’s 
the unnatural combat o f  the four primal elements.— It’s the breaking-up o f the ice-bound 
stream o f Time. But at last all these fancies yielded to that one portentous something in 
the picture’s midst. That once found out, and all the rest were plain, (p. 20)
“ That”— the key which when “found ou t” resolves all other levels of 
inscrutability in the picture “and all the rest were plain”—turns out to be 
“even the great leviathan h im self’ (p. 20). The cognitive hunt is on, yet a full 
seventy chapters pass before “leviathan h im self’ can be physically appre­
hended and Ishmael may finally rejoin the reader to “lay together our” 
heads (p. 278) in order to examine this portentous “that” in detail. And 
during that interim, leviathan has literally assumed the status o f an inaccessi­
ble phantom  for both Ishmael and the reader. Although Ishmael endeavors 
“to take hold of whales bodily, in their entire liberal volume, and boldly sort 
them  that way” (p. 123) in the “Cetology” chapter, he reminds the reader 
that in this approach to leviathan, “It is chiefly with his name that I now have 
to do” (p. 120). In the first attem pt to capture the living creature, the 
“fictitious m onster” (p. 193) not only eludes Ishmael’s grasp, but his sight 
as well—the boat is swamped by the unseen flukes and a rising sea, leaving 
Queequeg to try and signal the ship with a lantern on a waif-pole: “There, 
then, he sat, holding up that imbecile candle in the heart o f that almighty 
forlomness. There, then, he sat, the sign and symbol of a man without faith, 
hopelessly holding up hope in the midst o f despair” (p. 195). The reader may 
well begin wondering whether the involuntary “oath” which Ishmael ex­
tracted from him in the Spouter-Inn has put him on the trail o f a fact or 
fiction. Indeed, Ishmael returns to the medium of paint in the “O f the 
Monstrous Pictures o f W hales” chapter, but of the various representations 
o f the whale he shows the reader, “none can hit it with any very considerable 
degree o f exactness” (p. 228). Ishmael’s concluding advice to the reader does 
not appear too heartening:
So there is no earthly way o f finding out precisely what the whale really looks like. And 
the only mode in which you can derive even a tolerable idea of his living contour, is by 
going a whaling yourself; but by doing, you run no small risk o f  being eternally stove 
and sunk by him. Wherefore, it seems to me you had best not be too fastidious in your 
curiosity touching this Leviathan, (p. 228)
The atmosphere o f utter uncertainty in which the white whale swims for
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Ahab and the crew of the Pequod applies equally to leviathan in general for 
the reader. His actual knowledge o f the whale has been obscured throughout 
the first seventy chapters o f the novel in much the same m anner as the 
“m orbid hints, and half formed foetal suggestions o f supernatural agencies” 
have “invested Moby-Dick with new terrors unborrowed from anything that 
visibly appears” (p. 156). Thus when the taking o f a sperm whale follows 
hard on the heels o f Stubb’s right whale, the reader stands well-prepared to 
hear Ishmael’s lesson in comparative anatom y lay bare the aura o f mystery 
and make “all the rest . . . plain.” Ishmael commences this long-awaited 
com m entary with relish—his language borders on that o f a learned lecturer 
with his specimens at hand and his audience eagerly following his every 
word:
As the external difference between them is mainly observable in their heads; and as a 
head o f  each is this moment hanging from the Pequod's side; and as we may freely go from 
one to the other, by merely stepping across the deck:— where, I should like to know, will 
you obtain a better chance to study practical cetology than here? (p. 278)
In the first place, you are struck by the general contrast between these heads. Both are 
massive enough in all conscience; but there is a certain mathematical symmetry in the 
Sperm Whale’s which the Right Whale’s sadly lacks. . . (p. 278)
Let us now note what is least dissimilar in these heads— . . .  (p. 278)
Let us now with whatever levers and steam-engines we have at hand, cant over the sperm 
whale’s head, so that it may lie bottom up; then, ascending by a ladder to the summit, 
have a peep down the mouth. . . (p. 280)
Crossing the deck, let us now have a good long look at the Right Whale’s head. . . (p. 281)
Ishmael initially bespeaks all the assurances o f an accomplished anato ­
mist. He remains undaunted by the preliminary difficulties encountered in 
explicating what seems beyond comprehension, willing to consider certain 
unverifiable suppositions merely because they have “the savor o f analogical 
probability” (p. 282). At one point he recapitulates his findings for the reader 
by stopping “to sum up” (p. 283). But in “The Battering-Ram” chapter, 
Ishmael’s quasi-scientific discourse breaks down. Abandoning the relatively 
stable ground o f comparative anatomy, he also leaves behind the factually 
rooted yet cursory observations on the physical structure o f leviathan in 
order to probe the sperm whale’s m ore perplexing peculiarities. Ishmael 
avers that “the Sperm W hale’s head is a dead, blind wall. . .” (p. 284) “inesti­
mable by any m an who has not handled it” (p. 285). And while he still makes 
reference to what “has hypothetically occurred to m e” (p. 285), words such 
as “inexplicable,” “mystical,” and “unknow n” find their places once again 
in Ishmael’s language. He openly admonishes the reader by stating, “when 
I shall show you some of his m ore inconsiderable braining feats; I trust you 
will have renounced all ignorant incredulity, and be ready to abide by this; 
that though the Sperm Whale stove a passage through the Isthmus o f Darien,
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and mixed the Atlantic with the Pacific, you would not elevate one hair of 
your eye brow ” (p. 285). The thrust seems clear—lessons in “practical cet- 
ology” have but a limited application. They provide little more than a 
tentative and superficial grid for gauging the mysteries o f a creature who has 
“no nose, eyes, ears, or mouth; no face; he has none proper; nothing but 
that one broad firm am ent o f a forehead, pleated with riddles” (p. 292). 
Certainly Ishmael is not insensitive to the straits in which this abrupt change 
in tone leaves his “monkey-rope” companion. In his indecisiveness over the 
nature o f the whale’s spout, Ishmael takes the reader’s role for a m om ent 
to answer the obvious complaint that the orderly empiricism of “practical 
cetology” has collasped:
But why pester one with all this reasoning on the subject? Speak out! You have seen him 
spout; then declare what the spout is; can you not tell water from air? My dear sir, in 
this world it is not so easy to settle these plain things. I have ever found your plain things 
the knottiest o f  all. And as for this whale spout, you might almost stand in it, and yet 
be undecided as to what it is precisely, (pp. 312 13)
Finally Ishmael confesses, “Dissect him how I may, then, I go but skin 
deep; I know him not, and never will” (p. 318). Despite all the cognitive 
“cutting-in” and “trying-out,” the whale escapes unscathed. In the last o f the 
o s te n s ib le  ce to lo g ica l m e d ita t io n s — th e  “ W ill He P e rish ?” c h a p ­
ter—leviathan swims away, still all o f a piece, inscrutable, mysterious, and 
indomitable, spouting “his frothed defiance to the skies” (p. 385). If the 
reader recalls the painting in the Spouter-Inn, he cannot but realize “that” 
has not been “found ou t” and “all the rest” is not “plain.” Yet Ishmael by 
no means wantonly severs the “monkey-rope” nor forces a gullible reader 
to thread his own way through the uncertainties o f the novel’s final pages. 
For while Ishmael leads the reader on in a search for a meaning, he also 
makes the reader aware why one meaning is not forthcoming and why 
“your plain things” may be “the knottiest o f all.” In a sense, Ishmael’s overt 
instructions to the reader merely serve as a disguise for a series o f covert 
instructions which are designed to make the reader aware that he is engaged 
in the act o f cognition, i.e., the act o f reading and “raising a m eaning” from 
Moby-Dick. Rather than prescribing a theory o f epistemology, Ishmael con­
sistently points out the limits o f one’s habitual and familiar knowledge as 
a basis for cognition. His narrative m ethod in this respect has already been 
suggested in the “W heelbarrow” chapter. Ishmael anticipates the reader’s 
reaction to Queequeg’s shouldering o f the wheelbarrow by commenting 
“you might have known better than that, one would think” (p. 59), and 
thereby puts the reader in the position o f receiving Queequeg’s rejoinder. 
The effect is clear—the reader, like the “civilized” sea captain who visits 
Kokovoko, interprets what is unfamiliar by making it familiar.
Throughout the chapters in which he relates his initial meeting with 
Queequeg, Ishmael uses himself to illustrate the discrepancy between one’s 
familiar sphere o f knowledge and the unfamiliar. While awaiting his har-
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pooner’s arrival in the bedroom  at the Spouter-Inn, he seizes upon a peculiar 
item: “I took it up, and held it close to the light, and felt it, and smelt it, and 
tried every way possible to arrive at some satisfactory conclusion concerning 
it. I can compare it to nothing but a large doorm at” (p. 27). The object does 
not yield its mystery to Ishmael’s visual, tactile, and olfactory probings—it 
cannot be com prehended without recourse to an analogy with the familiar 
“doorm at,” which, as Ishmael fails not to rem ind the reader, provides no 
adequate explanation either: “But could it be possible that any sober har- 
pooner would get into a doorm at, and parade the streets o f any Christian 
town in that sort o f guise?” (p. 27). Queequeg himself presents no less a 
mystery upon entering the room. The absurdly jocular tone in Ishmael’s 
description o f Queequeg as a m an with “a mildewed skull . . .  a sticking- 
plaster shirt” and “legs. . .marked, as if a parcel o f dark green frogs were 
running up the trunks o f young palm s” (p. 29), simply points out the distor­
tion inherent in perceiving the unfamiliar in terms o f such familiarities. 
W hen Queequeg clambers under the bed in order to put his boots on, 
Ishmael remarks that “by no law o f propriety that I ever heard of, is any 
m an required to be private when putting on his boots” (p. 34). Queequeg 
performs “some sort o f Lent o r Ramadan, o r day o f fasting, humiliation and 
prayer,” and Ishmael observes that “how” it was I could never find out, for, 
though I applied myself to it several times, I could never master his liturgies 
and XXXIX Articles” (p. 66). In such passages Ishmael covertly urges the 
reader to become aware o f the inefficacy that his own “laws o f propriety” 
and “XXXIX Articles”—his habitually ingrained reality—will have in the 
pages ahead. For the problem  o f interpreting the unfamiliar does not find 
expression only in the contrast between “civilized” and “savage” man. Nor 
does Ishmael hesitate to inform the reader why an awareness o f his habitual 
reality will prove necessary for the act o f reading the novel:
So ignorant are most landsmen o f  some o f  the plainest and most palpable wonders o f
the world, that without some hints touching the plain facts, historical and otherwise, o f
the fishery, they might scout at Moby Dick as a monstrous fable, or still worse and more
detestable, a hideous and intolerable allegory, (p. 177)
Here Moby Dick might well be Moby-Dick, for Ishmael places param ount 
importance on the reader’s reception and interpretation o f the words o f the 
text. The “landsm an” who brings his own familiar and habitual contextual 
code to the unfamiliar world o f the text would necessarily project that 
context onto the novel as the context which governs the significance of 
objects and phenom ena—just as the various characters do in their “reading” 
o f the doubloon—unless the text itself anticipates this action on the reader’s 
part and calls his familiar context into question. Indeed, Ishmael’s most vital 
function as narrator may well consist o f his efforts to prevent the cognitive 
drive which he arouses in his reader from turning both Moby Dick and 
Moby-Dick into “a hideous and intolerable allegory.” The reader, then, finds
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that the whaling ship itself—which Ishmael appropriately calls “my Yale 
College and my H arvard” (p. 101)—provides not only an introductory course 
in “the mysteries of whaling” (p. 58), but also a means o f awakening the 
reader to his “landed” perspective. The perception o f the world by a “whale­
m an” and a “landsm an” may differ as much as between “savage” and 
“civilized” man. The familiar and the unfamiliar as defined by the habitual 
experiences o f each group may even be mutually exclusive, because “for 
years he (the whaleman) knows not the land; so that when he comes to it 
at last, it smells like another world, more strangely than the moon would 
to an Earthsm an” (p. 63). In this light, Ishmael’s leading of the reader from 
the mysteries o f Queequeg to “ the mysteries o f whaling” is not at all incon­
gruous: “Long exile from Christendom and civilization inevitably restores 
m an to that condition in which God placed him, i.e. what is called savagery. 
Your whale-hunter is as much a savage as an Iroquois” (p. 232).
Certainly much o f the specialized vocabulary and actual workings o f the 
whaling ship explained by Ishmael form a part of the reader’s whaling 
education. In several chapters, such as “The Line,” Ishmael indeed tells the 
reader that such explanations serve “for the better understanding of all 
similar scenes elsewhere presented” (p. 238). The reading o f Moby-Dick, 
however, will not make one a whaleman any m ore than it will give him the 
“double” eyesight o f the sperm  whale, and Ishmael’s use of the whaleman 
as someone who has been “forced into familiarity” (p. 158) with the unfamil­
iar functions primarily as a tool to dislodge the reader’s habitual context o f 
“landedness” as a cognitive foundation. Such sights as “in mountainous 
countries. . .the profiles o f whales defined along the undulating ridges” are 
visible only to “a thorough whalem an” (p. 233), and in other passages 
Ishmael further reinforces the assertion that the landsman remains blind to 
certain phenomena:
As the three boats lay there on that gently rolling sea, gazing down into its eternal blue 
noon; and as not a single groan or cry o f  any sort, nay, not so much as a ripple or a bubble 
came up from its depths; what landsman would have thought, that beneath all that silence 
and placidity, the utmost monster o f  the seas was writhing and wrenching in agony!
(p. 300)
Nevertheless, the experimental world o f the whaleman does not posit for 
the reader a context through which the significance of things may be per­
ceived. In a qualification o f his comparison o f the whaleman to a savage, 
Ishmael claims, “I myself am a savage, owning no allegiance but to the King 
of the Cannibals; and ready at any m om ent to rebel against him ” (p. 232). 
The m etaphor indicates that Ishmael not only rejects adopting any single 
contextual perspective, but also proposes no single context to the reader, 
for to do so would necessarily place interpretive borders on the symbolic 
potential o f objects and phenom ena. The use o f the “whaling” world as 
opposed to the “landed” world is, m ore properly, a device by which Ishmael 
creates for the reader a state o f utter “landlessness,” a state in which the
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“harborless immensities” o f the sea itself can suggest an essentially fluid 
contextual horizon that reveals the symbolic plurality of things through a 
perpetually shifting “illumining” background:
So, though in the clear air o f  day, suspended against a blue-veined neck, the pure-watered 
diamond drop will healthful glow; yet, when the cunning jeweller would show you the 
diamond in its most impressive lustre, he lays it against a gloomy ground, and then lights 
it up, not by the sun, but by some unnatural gases. Then come out those fiery effulgences, 
infernally superb; then the evil-blazing diamond, once the divinest symbol o f the crystal 
skies, looks like some crown jewel stolen from the King o f  Hell. (p. 345)
Thus Ishmael displays particular care in pointing out that his own experi­
ences o f an insight into the nature o f things are inextricably tied to a specific 
though fleeting and transient set o f perceptual conditions, and that such 
insights do not represent purely transcendental moments which exist on the 
level o f a “thing in itself.” His remarks on the workings of “chance, free will, 
and necessity” in “The Mat-Maker” chapter, for example, cannot be di­
vorced from his prefatory remarks on how that perception came about: “I 
say so strange a dreaminess did there then reign all over the ship and all over 
the sea, only broken by the intermitting dull sound o f the sword, that it 
seemed as if this were the Loom of Tim e” (italics mine, p. 185). Likewise, 
Ishmael’s vision o f “long rows o f angels in paradise, each with his hands in 
a ja r  o f spermaceti,” in the “A Squeeze o f the H and” chapter, remains firmly 
rooted in the tem porary concatenation o f several factors:
As I sat there at my ease, cross-legged on the deck; after the bitter exertion at the 
windlass; under a blue tranquil sky; the ship under indolent sail, and gliding so serenely 
along; as I bathed my hands among those soft, gentle globules o f  infiltrated tissues, woven 
almost within the hour; as they richly broke to my fingers, and discharged all their 
opulence, like fully ripe grapes their wine; as I snuffed up that uncontaminated aroma,— 
literally and truly, like the smell o f  spring violets; I declare to you, that for the time I lived 
as in a musky meadow; I forgot all about our horrible oath; in that inexpressible sperm,
I washed my hands and heart o f  it. . . (italics mine, p. 348)
For the reader, too, landlessness consists o f precisely such m om entary and 
transient glimpes into the symbolic world o f Moby-Dick. Yet no single percep­
tion or insight can be extracted from the flux o f landlessness as a “true” or 
“real” cognition any m ore than one may identify one “true” appearance of 
“the pure-watered diamond drop .” And although Ishmael himself recoils 
from the “illumining” light o f the fire in “The Try-Works” chapter and 
proclaims “the natural sun . . . the only true lam p—all others but liars!” 
(p. 354), he cannot avoid adding, “Nevertheless the sun hides not Virginia’s 
Dismal Swamp, nor Rome’s accursed Campagna, nor wide Sahara, nor all 
the millions of miles o f deserts and o f griefs beneath the moon. The sun 
hides not the ocean, which is the dark side of this earth, and which is two 
thirds of this earth” (pp. 354-55). The sun may remove Ishmael’s “unnatural 
hallucination of the night” (p. 354), but will in turn illuminate other visions 
no more “kind to our m ortalities.” Man seems incapable of resolving the
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dialectic between his desire for contextual stability in the world itself and 
the landlessness which keeps his cognitive efforts in a cycle of flux and 
process:
Would to God these blesssed calms would last. But the mingled, mingling threads o f  life 
are woven by warp and woof; calms crossed by storms, a storm for every calm. There 
is no steady unretracing progress in this life; we do not advance through fixed gradations, 
and at the last one pause:— through infancy’s unconscious spell, boyhood’s thoughtless 
faith, adolescence’ doubt (the common doom), then scepticism, then disbelief, resting at 
last in manhood’s pondering repose o f  If. But once gone through, we trace the round 
again; and are infants, boys, and men, and Ifs eternally, (p. 406)
In these “mingled, mingling threads o f life” Ishmael weaves a narrative 
which simultaneously feeds and denies the reader’s cognitive impulse. Not 
only is the world landless in its ceaseless change and transformation, but 
m an is also landless in that he does no t constitute a stable being in his 
temporal existence. With both perceiver and perceived in constant “m o­
tion,” the ontological verification o f an all-subsuming context through which 
an absolute act o f cognition may be effected can become both a “m onom a­
nia” and a “m onophobia.” For the reader that quest is endless—he must 
“trace the round again”—because, like Ishmael’s narrative, the quest is 
circular. In the temporality o f the reading process he does “not advance 
through fixed gradations, and at the last one pause,” but rather reaches the 
“Epilogue” in which the quotation from the Book o f Job leads him back to 
the telling o f the tale, that is, the “beginning” o f Moby-Dick. The implied 
circularity o f the narrative serves as a m etaphor for the reader’s textual 
experience o f cognitive landlessness, as the form itself precludes one’s ability 
to select a specific part o f the circle which embodies the experience o f 
circularity more than another part. Ishmael creates a verbal structure de­
signed to give the reader the experience in language o f “that mortally 
intolerable tru th” that “in landlessness alone resides the highest truth, shore­
less, indefinite as G od” (p. 97). Yet only by engaging the reader’s cognitive 
impulse can Ishmael lead him to glimpse “the highest tru th” which is be­
yond cognition, just as only by engaging the reader’s habitual experiental 
context can Ishmael reveal that the context for Moby-Dick is no context. The 
novel cannot, therefore, be interpreted in the sense of naming or identifying 
meaning—it exists only to be experienced by the reader in the act of 
reading. And that experience is guided by the dynamic interaction between 
Ishmael and the reader as well as by the dialectical interplay of the cognitive 
drive and its impossibility o f fulfillment—contrary pressures which exert a 
force on the reader’s m ovem ent through the text like the contradictory 
winds that move the Perquod in “The Spirit-Spout” chapter: “. . .she rushed 
along, as if two antagonistic influences were struggling in her—one to m ount 
direct to heaven, the other to drive yawingly to some horizontal goal” 
(p. 200). In this dialectic the novel achieves its peculiar parity  and 
commensurability with “the ungraspable phantom ” which it ostensibly fails 
to capture—Moby-Dick itself becomes the phantom  for the reader.
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